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ABSTRACT
Techniques are presented herein that support a new mechanism that employs a
software-defined networking (SDN) controller for detecting paths that are experiencing
packet loss. Aspects of the mechanism employ path tracing (PT) probe packets that are
generated by a source node towards a sink node and which follow the same path as
customer traffic with a matching entropy label value thus providing the path tracing. A
transit node that encounters a forwarding issue while processing a PT probe packet arising
from a forwarding loop (e.g., detected through a time to live or a hop limit value of zero),
a next-hop lookup failure in a forwarding information base (FIB), an interface maximum
transmission unit (MTU) exceeded, a Layer 2 (L2) header issue, a reverse-path forwarding
(RPF) check failure, an access control list (ACL) drop or a quality of service (QoS) tail
drop, a denial-of-service (DoS) attack causing packet drop, etc. can immediately trigger to
forward the received packet (including the original header and the collected path tracing
data) with a new encapsulation to a controller. Such encapsulation may also include an
additional type-length-value (TLV) containing troubleshooting information, such as a
reason for a packet being dropped, to be able to quickly diagnose the packet loss on a transit
node.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
As an initial matter, it will be helpful to confirm the meaning of a number of the
terms that appear in the narrative that is presented below. Specifically:
Term

Description

ELC

Entropy label control.

FIB

Forwarding information base. A forwarding table in hardware.

HL

Hop limit in an Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) packet.
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Midpoint

A transit node that performs plain forwarding (or segment routing (SR) endpoint
processing) and records PT information into a PT probe packet.

PT

Path tracing.

SEL

Structured entropy label.

SNK

A sink node that receives PT probes sent from a SRC containing the information recorded
by every PT Midpoint along the path and forwards them to controller after recording its PT
information.

SRC

A source node that starts a PT session and generates PT probes.

TTL

Time to live.

Packet loss is a common problem that almost every network operator faces.
Operators rely on transport protocols (such as, for example, Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP)) to retransmit lost packets. Consequently, packets may arrive in an out-of-order
sequence. Hence, a packet reordering mechanism is needed. Such a mechanism may be
implemented by the operator or it may be left to the TCP stack on a host. In either case,
packet reordering may involve a significant amount of buffering that would increase the
end-to-end delay and thus degrade an application’s quality of experience (QoE) and
service-level agreement (SLA).
Traffic blackholing due to FIB programming errors is common issue that network
operators. While many improvements have been made, by network equipment providers,
in FIB and Routing Information Base (RIB) routing components, solutions involving these
components often lack automation using a controller to speed up the detection and analysis
of packet loss.
In networking, a packet drop attack or blackhole attack is a type of denial-of-service
(DoS) attack in which a router that is supposed to forward packets instead discards them.
This usually occurs when a router becomes compromised from several different causes.
One such cause that is mentioned in the research is through a DoS attack on the router.
Because packets are often dropped in a network, the packet drop attack is very hard to
detect and prevent.
A router may drop a packet for several reasons, such as a TTL or HL expiration (as
a result of, for example, a forwarding loop), a maximum transmission unit (MTU) size
issue, a quality of service (QoS) tail drop, a next hop not found or not being reachable, an
access control list (ACL) drop, a DoS attack, etc.
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Troubleshooting the packet loss problem is operationally very challenging, as it
requires solving a set of sub-problems. Those sub-problems include detecting an end-toend packet loss, detecting the router where the packet loss has occurred, and detecting the
root cause for packet loss.
The first sub-problem is typically solved by deploying a solution that does absolute
packet counting at the edge (e.g., the ingress and egress points) of the operator network.
The Alternate-Marking Method that is defined in the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 8321 is one example of such a solution.
The second and the third sub-problems remain a significant operational challenge.
Some operators enable packet counting on the ingress and egress points of each device on
the packet path for the flow that experiences end-to-end packet loss. Then, they may
compare the counters to identify the device that causes the packet drop. Once the device
is found, the operator must then delve into the hardware counters to identify the root cause
for the drop. However, such a solution is not scalable for several reasons:


Enabling packet counting of each device for all paths cannot scale as there may
be thousands (or even tens of thousands) of paths between two provider edge
(PE) devices;



An operator may not be able to detect all of the paths between ingress and egress
points since the probe packets that are used to detect the paths experience the
same path loss as the customer packets;



The manual process of verifying counters raises significant operational
challenges and may take operators hours, if not days, to solve an issue;



Even an automated solution that streams the router counters would fall into the
same scaling issue. The router telemetry system would need to periodically
stream the counters which would consume central processing unit (CPU) cycles
that are needed for other critical processes like routing.

Additionally, a

controller would need to process a huge amount of streamed telemetry in order
to detect the packet loss, and hence the scale issue; and


The interval at which the telemetry information is streamed is slow (e.g., on the
order of tens of seconds) which results in a slower identification of the path
with packet loss.
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To address the types of challenges that were described above, techniques are
presented herein that support a software-defined networking (SDN) controller-based
solution for detecting the network paths that are experiencing packet loss. Aspects of the
presented techniques leverage PT probe packets and define a new behavior on transit
routers that encapsulates the (to be dropped) PT probe packets and, instead of dropping
them, forwards them to an SDN controller. Under further aspects of the presented
techniques, a transit router may also include a drop reason in the probe packets that are
forwarded to the controller. The controller may use the PT probe packets, which are
forwarded from the transit routers, to detect the node where the packet loss occurs. The
controller may then show the reason for the drop and more information about the drop
reason. For example, in the case of packet loss caused by a forwarding loop, the controller,
leveraging the PT probe information, can show the nodes that are part of the forwarding
loops.
A PT solution works by having a controller configure all of the interfaces in the
network with an identifier (ID) and then configure a SRC node with a PT session. The
SRC node then generates probes according to the PT session parameters. Each Midpoint
on the packet path records its PT information in the PT TLV in the PT probe. A SNK node
receives the PT probes that are sent from the SRC (containing the information recorded by
every PT Midpoint along the path) and forwards them to the controller after recording its
PT information.
It is important to note that the PT probes between a given SRC and SNK follow the
same path as the customer packets between those two nodes. Hence, they experience the
same forwarding behavior as customer packets. For example, if there is a forwarding loop
between a SRC and a SNK, the PT probes will experience the forwarding loop in the same
way as the customer packets and will eventually be dropped.
Techniques are presented herein that build on a PT solution (for tracing packet paths
and for measuring the hop-by-hop delay for IPv6 and MPLS data planes) and define a
solution for detecting the network paths that are experiencing packet loss. Aspects of the
presented techniques are based on an SDN controller. The presented techniques allow
operators to detect the nodes where the packet loss happens. Further, under the presented
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techniques the controller shows the root cause for the packet loss with additional
information that may help the operator to correct the issue.
An SDN controller is responsible for provisioning all of the nodes (e.g., SRC,
Midpoint, and SNK) in a network. It is also responsible for collecting probes that are
exported from nodes that are experiencing packet loss, analyzing them, and providing the
operators with information about those nodes and the root cause for the packets being
dropped.
Figure 1, below, depicts elements of an exemplary solution according to aspects of
the techniques presented herein and reflective of the above discussion.

Figure 1: Controller-based Solution for Detecting Paths Experiencing Packet Loss
The details for each of the components of the exemplary solution that was presented
in Figure 1, above, will be discussed in the following sections.
Section 1 – Controller (Part 1)

5

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2022

6715

6

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 5092 [2022]

A controller is composed of two parts, each of which perform a different job. The
first part is responsible for the provisioning of all of the nodes in the network. The second
part (which will be discussed in Section 5, below) is responsible for collecting and
analyzing probes to detect paths that are experiencing packet loss.
The provisioning job of the SDN controller (i.e., the first part as described above)
encompasses a series of steps. First, the controller provisions all of the nodes in the network
with the PT configuration including the interface ID and the policy which will be used to
encapsulate and forward the probes to the controller as shown in Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Controller Configures Nodes with SR Policy to Forward Dropped Probes
Second, the configuration installs a FIB entry on all of the nodes (e.g., midpoints
and sink nodes) with an SR policy to send PT packets to the controller. The FIB entry will
be used to forward any dropped PT probes to the controller by encapsulating it and then
forwarding to the controller. Third, the controller configures a PT session on a SRC node
to generate probes towards a SNK node.
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Section 2 – SRC Node
A SRC node, based on the PT session that is configured by the controller, generates
PT probes towards a SNK node. A SRC node will generate many such probes, according
to the "probing rate" of the PT session which was configured by the controller. The SRC
node also records its PT data, such as an interface ID in a PT-TLV.
Section 3 – Midpoint Node
The Midpoint node may elect to drop a PT probe because the TTL or HL has
expired due to a forwarding loop. It may also elect to drop the PT probe because of a QoS
tail drop, an ACL match or a FIB lookup failure, a Layer 2 (L2) L2-Adjacent Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) issue, a L2 header issue, a DoS attack, etc. In such a case, the
Midpoint will forward the dropped probe to a controller.
According to aspects of the techniques presented herein, the new behavior that was
described above overwrites the Midpoint node's packet drop action such that the Midpoint
node encapsulates the packet and forwards the encapsulated packet through a fast data path
to a controller.
The new action of overwriting the Midpoint node's behavior is applicable to both
IPv6 as well as the MPLS data plane. The following pseudocode describes the behavior:
For any Midpoint router
if (Midpoint action == DROP and packet is a PT probe)
encapsulate and forward the packet to the controller
else
drop the packet as usual

The Midpoint node leverages the PT TLV of the encapsulation that was added to
encode additional information such as a reason for the new behavior trigger (e.g., no nexthop match was found in the FIB) such that it can be used by the controller to promptly help
troubleshoot the packet loss issue. It is important to note that the Midpoint node may insert
another TLV to carry the information regarding the reason for dropping a packet.
Section 4 – SNK Node
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The SNK node normally encapsulates the received PT probes and forwards them
to the controller after recording its PT information. If the SNK node decides to drop the
PT probe for any of the reasons previously mentioned, the same behavior as in the Midpoint
will be triggered to forward the dropped probe packet to the controller.
Section 5 – Controller (Part 2)
As noted previously, the controller is composed of two parts, each of which perform
a different job. The first part was described in Section 1, above. The second part, which
will be described in this section, is responsible for collecting and analyzing PT probes to
detect paths that are experiencing packet loss.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that PT probes may be one of two types:


A first probe type encompasses PT probes that have successfully completed
their journey in a network, have collected the PT information from all of the
nodes on a path, and have been forwarded by a SNK node.



A second type of probes that are received by the controller are the probes that
were intended to be dropped but which were forwarded by a node to a controller.
These probes will be used to detect the paths that are experiencing packet loss.

A controller may differentiate between the two types of probes according to the
following process.
If a controller detects that the IPv6 DA of the original PT probe packet is located
(based on the locator of a node) differently from what is identified by the SA of the outer
IPv6 address, then the PT probe has been forwarded by a node other than the SNK node at
which it was supposed to arrive and hence this a dropped PT probe. A similar check may
also be performed on the IPv4 or MPLS probe packets using the SA of the Midpoint node
and the original destination of the PT packet.
Further, a node that drops a probe inserts a TLV to carry the reason for the drop.
The existence of such a TLV indicates that the packet that was received by the controller
is for a dropped PT probe. Additionally, as the original PT probe packet is sent to a
controller, the controller can check the validity of the PT probe packet header to detect the
error type (e.g., a TTL or HL value of zero).
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Using the information from the original probe packet, a controller may analyze the
packet drops that are specific to a particular DSCP value (e.g., due to the queue that is used
by that DSCP) or that are specific to a packet size (e.g., due to an issue with the fabric
switching that size packet).
In addition to differentiating between the two types of probes, a controller
implements a packet loss module which receives the second category of probes to identify
the node that causes a loss and the reason for that loss. The controller may provide a
dashboard where it shows the nodes that are experiencing the loss, the reason for the loss,
and some additional information that can help an operator in troubleshooting the issue.
For each type of packet loss, a controller may provide different types of additional
information that is specific to the packet loss. For example, for nodes that are dropping
packets because of FIB lookup issues, the controller will show the DA of the packet that
causes the FIB issue on that node.
For nodes that are dropping packets because of TTL or HL expiration, the controller
will show the TTL or HL value of the dropped packet. The TTL or HL value does not need
to be zero, as some operators may configure nodes to drop a packet with a TTL or HL that
is less than a given value (e.g., using an ACL) based on their network topology. The
controller will also show the packet path up to the node where a TTL or HL expired. The
controller will be able to detect if a forwarding loop happens and show the nodes of that
loop. For other types of packet loss, the controller may show the relevant information to
aid an operator in fixing the issue.
As described and illustrated in the above discussion, under aspects of the techniques
presented herein PT probes are generated by a SRC node and then forwarded towards a
SNK node. Further, a PT Probe might be dropped at the SRC node for the same reasons
that it could be dropped at any one of the nodes on the path. Additionally, the SRC node
supports the same behavior as Midpoint and SNK nodes to forward dropped probes to a
controller.
Use of the techniques presented herein offers a number of advantages. For example,
aspects of the presented techniques support finding the exact path with packet loss that is
experienced by a customer’s data packets. Using automation, an immediate alert may be
issued to an operator regarding the node that is dropping packets.
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Additionally, the behavior that encapsulates the probes and forwards them to a
controller is performed over a fast data path and hence does not raise any scaling issues.
Among other things, there is no packet punting or control plane involvement.
Further, aspects of the presented techniques leverage the PT mechanisms for
finding the path with packet loss. The presented techniques are scalable as only a PT probe
packet with a packet loss condition is forwarded to a controller.
Further still, a PT packet contains the original header with the forwarding problem
(e.g., a next-hop address not found, or a TTL or HL value, etc.) that can very quickly help
isolate the reason for packet loss. A PT packet that is received at a controller may contain
additional information that can be used to quickly determine the root cause of a packet loss
condition (such as, for example, forwarding loops, a missing FIB entry on a line card, a
provisioning error, etc.).
Finally, aspects of the presented techniques are able to detect many different
conditions that can result in packet loss on a path. As just one example, the presented
techniques can immediately detect any security DoS attack on a node that results in the
dropping of packets.
As described and illustrated in the above narrative, the techniques presented herein
define a solution for detecting where packet loss happens in a network and identifying the
root causes for the packet loss. Such a solution may, among other things, be used to provide
a value-added service to various path assurance solutions.
The presented techniques work in an active manner to detect network problems
before there is any impact to customer traffic. This is a radically different approach from
current path assurance solutions that are based on external probing appliances that impose
a number of limitations on those solutions and which, by design, cannot be addressed.
A first existing solution may be employed to detect applications that are
experiencing loss. From a service provider’s point of view, they need to verify the paths
that are available and measure the experience of the packets. The first existing solution
may be used only for buffer and congestion drop, and does not support other types of drops.
For example, the first existing solution does not support ACL-based drops or drops that
arise from MTU truncation. In contrast, the presented techniques detect all types of drops
as well the root cause (which is exported in the TLV) for such drops.
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Additionally, the first existing solution exports a very large number of packets (i.e.,
all of the dropped customer traffic). In contrast, the presented techniques employ fewer
probes that experience all different paths, and hence may provide much better scale.
Further, packets that are exported by the first existing solution can tell the controller
only where a packet was dropped. In contrast, the packets that are exported by aspects of
the techniques presented herein already contain the path information and can, as a result,
provide the path (up to the dropping node) affected by the drop.
A second existing solution collects data about a path. If a packet is dropped, there
are no means to detect where the packet was dropped and why the packet was dropped.
While the use of a controller can allow for the detection of end-to-end packet loss, still
there is no way to detect where packet loss has happened and there is no information on
the root cause of a drop.
A variant of the second existing solution takes a direct export or marking approach
and employs postcards where every node on the path exports its information to a controller.
However, the controller needs to collect and correlate all of the postcards that are exported
from all of the nodes on a path to identify the node where a drop took place. However,
such an approach still does not know the reason for the drop at that node. Additionally,
such a postcard-based approach has a significant scaling issue at the controller which must
correlate all of the postcards from all of the nodes.
In an IPv6 network, operators always encapsulate customer packets from an ingress
PE (iPE) to an egress PE (ePE) in an outer IPv6 header. Such an outer IPv6 header is what
matters for forwarding packets from an iPE to an ePE. As described previously, aspects of
the techniques presented herein generate probes with the same outer IPv6 header as
customer packets. As a result, those probes will experience the same path as customer
packets. That is, by configuring all of the parameters of a probe packet so that the generated
probes have an outer IPv6 packet such packets experience (i.e., follow) the same path as
the customer traffic.
Consequently, the presented techniques guarantee that packet loss in the user traffic
stream is reflected in a corresponding packet loss in the probes, and vice versa, under
transitory conditions that may be causing packet loss. Appendix D of the Metro Ethernet
Forum (MEF) specification document 35.1 introduces the Coefficient of Variation (CoV)
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as the ratio of a probability density's standard deviation to its mean. When such a measure
is applied to synthetic loss measurements in a network, the CoV may be defined as follows:

In the above formula, p (the probability of loss) is the actual Frame Loss Ratio of
the network and n is the sample size (i.e., the number of probes). For a reasonable
confidence interval, MEF 35.1 proposes a maximum CoV of 0.2. Setting the above
equation to be less than or equal to 0.2 and solving for n yields the following:

The number of probes, n, varies as the inverse of p (i.e., the actual loss in the
network). This implies that the smaller the level of loss, the more probes that are necessary
to detect the loss. Table 1, below, presents the total number of probes (n) and the probes
per second (PPS) that are required to detect various levels of loss (p) from 1% to 30%
(assuming a CoV that is equal to 0.2) in a one-minute grouping of probes.

p

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

17%

18%

29%

30%

n

2475

1225

808

600

475

392

332

288

253

225

202

183

167

122

114

61

58

PPS

42

21

14

10

8

7

6

5

5

4

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

Table 1: Illustrative Probe Metrics
In summary, techniques have been presented that support a new mechanism that
employs an SDN controller for detecting paths that are experiencing packet loss. Aspects
of the mechanism employ PT probe packets that are generated by a source node towards a
sink node on the same path as customer traffic. Under aspects of the presented techniques,
a transit node that encounters a forwarding issue while processing a PT packet arising from
any of a forwarding loop (e.g., detected through a time to live or a hop limit value of zero),
a next-hop lookup failure in a FIB, an interface MTU exceeded, a L2 header issue, a
reverse-path forwarding (RPF) check failure, an ACL drop or a QoS tail drop, a DoS attack
causing packet drop, etc. can immediately trigger a new behavior to forward the received
12
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packet (including the original header and the collected path tracing data) with a new
encapsulation to a controller. Such encapsulation may also include an additional TLV
containing troubleshooting information, such as a reason for a packet being dropped, to be
able to quickly diagnose the packet loss on a transit node.
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